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Abstract: We analyze the outsourcing decision of a firm for a key input of a final good 
production to an independent input supplier even though the firm has an option of producing 
that key input in-house at a lower cost with a better technology. We find that for smaller 
technology gap with the independent input supplier the firm would outsource and for larger 
technology gap it would produce the input in-house for itself and for its rivals. The 
outsourcing occurs in order to take advantage of its sale of superior technology to the 
independent input supplier at a high payment although it involves a high price for the input to 
be acquired from the monopoly input supplier. Though the firm gains from strategic 
outsourcing, consumers’ welfare as well as social welfare goes down.  
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Strategic Outsourcing with Technology Transfer 
 
Introduction 
Outsourcing the production of key input is a widespread phenomenon in modern business. 
How the firms organize their production and whether they also sell the intermediate inputs to 
their rivals are very subtle and complex decisions that involve significant strategic 
considerations. The traditional firm theory would dictate that a firm confronted with the 
choice of in-house production versus outsourcing would typically depend on the cost 
consideration, and the firm would choose the least cost option.
1
We analyze a setting in which there are two final good producers competing in Cournot 
quantities. There exists an independent input supplier who does not produce the final product. 
However, one of the final good producers, say firm 1, has a superior technology to produce 
the key input in-house and then it can also participate in the input market to compete with the 
independent input supplier to sell the input to its rival (say firm 2). Firm 2 does not have the 
requisite technology to produce the input in-house; so it has to depend on the input market to 
source its input. In this setting we analyze the decision of firm 1 between outsourcing the 
input from the independent input suppler or producing it in-house and also the decision to 
transfer the technology to the independent input supplier. We would show that firm 1 would 
outsource the key input if the gap between its input production technology and that of the 
independent supplier is small, and it would produce the input in-house and also supply to its 
rival when the technology gap is large. When the outsourcing is done, firm 1 buys the input 
 However, in an imperfectly 
competitive market structure most decisions are based on complex strategic considerations 
and it is not surprising that a firm might outsource a key input from the outside supplier even 
though it can be produced cheaply in-house. In this paper we focus on such a scenario of 
outsourcing. 
 
                                                            
1 Starting from Coase (1937), the modern theory of firm has mainly focused on the transaction costs involving 
asset specificity and incomplete contract and thus tried to explain the extent of integration (Williamson 1985, 
Grossman and Hart (1986); also see Gibbons (2005) for a nice survey on the theory of firm). Grossman and 
Helpman (2002) have studied the determinants of the equilibrium production mode (i.e., integration versus 
outsourcing) in industries where inputs are fully or partially specialized. However, we are concerned with the 
non-specific input.  2 
 
from the monopoly input supplier at a price much higher than its in-house production cost. 
However, the advantage of outsourcing stems from softening of competition in the  final 
goods market and this in turn accrues to firm 1 through a payment for the technology sold to 
the independent input supplier. 
 
Our paper is very closely related to Arya et al (2008a). They have considered a similar 
framework like ours along with the possibility that the rival firm may be a potential entrant. 
They have shown that the decision to outsource to the same supplier rather than producing 
inputs internally, even when the outsourcing is more costly than internal production, is 
justified on the ground that it can reduce the incentive of the supplier to deliver inputs to the 
rival on favorable terms. In their model, the monopoly input supplier can price discriminate 
between incumbent and entrant firms and the prices are set sequentially and thus the 
outsourcing decision leads to the prospect of higher input prices for rival that might even 
deter potential rivals from entering the industry. Our paper is different from theirs on many 
counts. Among the main differences, first, in case of outsourcing in our model the monopoly 
input supplier does not price discriminate. It only quotes the monopoly price in the input 
market and the final good producers buy their inputs as per their demand at the quoted price. 
Second, in our case when firm 1, with having a superior technology of input production, 
decides to produce the input in-house, not only it produces for itself it can also participate in 
the input market and compete in prices with the outside input supplier. Given the possibility 
of input market participation we show that, unlike Arya et al (2008a), it is always profitable 
for firm 1 to participate in the input market and as a result the in-house input producing firm 
can never commit not to sell the input to its rival.
2
                                                            
2 Arya et al (2008) do not consider the possibility of technology transfer and the firm with the input production 
facility would not outsource when its own cost of production is lower than the independent input supplier.  
  Third, we allow the possibility of 
technology transfer from firm 1 to the input supplier. Another closely related paper is by 
Chen (2011), which showed that the outsourcing decision of an incumbent might prevent the 
entry of a potential entrant as the incumbent can commit to an aggressive  post entry 
competition. In his model the outsourcing has ambiguous welfare effect. There is no entry 
deterrence story in our model, and the final good market is always duopoly; it is the input 
market which becomes monopoly under outsourcing. Thus, our work complements the works 
of Arya et al (2008a) and Chen (2011).       3 
 
 
Related literature  
 
With the liberalization of trade and openness in most part of the world, international 
outsourcing has assumed great significance. There is a sharp rise in outsourcing activities in 
recent decades (Hummels et al., 1998; Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). Given its empirical 
prevalence, both inside an economy and in international context, there exists a large body of 
literature attempting to analyze the topic from various dimensions. Here we focus on the most 
relevant ones.    
 
The benefit of strategic outsourcing in terms of raising rivals costs is illustrated in Salop and 
Scheffman (1983, 1987). In a model with Cournot competition in both upstream and 
downstream, Schrader and Martin (1998) focus on the advantage of excessive outsourcing in 
order to reduce the market supply to rival downstream producers. In the presence of 
economies of scale Shy and Stenbacka (2003) have analyzed the strategic incentives of 
oligopoly firms in outsourcing the production of inputs. By outsourcing inputs a firm can 
avoid the investment in fixed cost for its in-house production, all the more so if one's rivals 
have already gone to an outsider and created the scale economies there.  Buehler and Haucap 
(2006) show outsourcing that increases production costs can be mutually profitable for 
downstream producers when it softens the competition in the final goods market. Even when 
the rival is doing in-house production, outsourcing orders with the rival will only enhance its 
economies of scale and lower its costs, making it a more formidable competitor in the final 
goods market (Yutian Chen and Dubey, 2009). Arya et al. (2008b) was concerned with the 
price versus quantity competition when the production of key inputs is outsourced to a 
vertically integrated retail competitor with upstream market power. They find that Bertrand 
competition can lead to higher prices, higher industry profit, lower consumer surplus, and 
lower welfare than Cournot competition. Chen et al (2011) have introduced another aspect of 
strategic competition where the input-seeking firm fully reveals its plans to the vertically 
integrated rival by placing the amount of order that it intends to become the Stackelberg 
leader in the final product market. It is the rival who, seeing through this ploy, refuses to play 
the role of the input provider and drives the firm to outsource elsewhere. It is shown that 
under some circumstances the vertically integrated firm would like to be Stackelberg follower 
and supply the input to its rival. 4 
 
 
Towards the end we must mention that though our model is posed in the context of a standard 
vertical structure model of industrial organization,
3
 our model is equally applicable in the 
context of international outsourcing. The firms can be from different countries competing in 
the world market. Using our model one can investigate different policy options for different 
countries, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in Section 5 we have discussed 
an immediate application of our model in the context of international outsourcing. It is argued 
that trade liberalization leading to outsourcing may be detrimental for any developed country 
which typically outsource inputs from developing countries.
4
There are three firms. Firm 1 and 2 produce a homogeneous final good. Final good 
production requires a non-specific key input. Firm 1 has access to a technology for producing 
the key input whereas firm 2 cannot produce the key input for itself. Firm 3 can produce the 
key input and sell in the input market but it cannot produce the final good. Firm 1 has a 
technology for input production, which is superior to that of firm 3. Firm 1 and 2 compete in 
quantities in the final good market. The final good production technology converts one unit 
of input into one unit of output. We assume for simplicity that no other inputs are required for 
production of final good, and the production of final good does not involve any other cost 
  
The rest of the paper is presented according to the following scheme. Section 2 provides the 
framework of our analysis and elaborates the game. We undertake the analysis in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the welfare results. In section 5 we highlight the significance and 
robustness of our model. Then in section 6 we conclude the paper.   
 
2.1 The Framework  
                                                            
3 Among others, Mukherjee and Ray (2007) and Van Long (2005) discuss the issues of outsourcing in the 
scenario of R&D and technology spillovers. 
4 There is a considerable literature on international outsourcing. Among others, see Antràs and Helpman, 2006, 
McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005) etc. Pack and Saggi (2004) are concerned with the 
international outsourcing under vertical technology transfer from the developed country firms to less developed 
country firms; they find that there is benefit of technology transfer even though technology might be diffused to 




except the cost of this key input. The unit cost of producing one unit of input by firm 1 and 3 
are respectively  1 c  and  2 c ;  2 1 0 c c < ≤ . The superior technology of firm 1 can be licensed or 
the patent for that technology can be sold without incurring any additional cost.  
 
2.2 The Game  
Stage 1: firm 1 decides whether to sell the patent for its superior technology or to license the 
technology to the independent input supplier (firm 3). The independent input supplier either 
accepts or rejects the offer. We consider that in either case of technology sale or licensing, 
only fixed payment from firm 3 to firm 1 would be made. Firm 1’s option of neither selling 
the patent nor licensing the technology, can be thought of as making an unacceptable offer by 
firm 1 to firm 3.  
Stage 2: In case firm 1 has sold the patent in the first stage, then both the final good 
producers buy the required amount of input at the prevailing price in the input market from 
the monopoly input supplier. Whereas if the technology is not sold and firm 1 decides to 
produce the input in-house, then only firm 2 buys input from the input market and firm 1 
competes with firm 3 to sell input to firm 2. We assume that input market competition takes 
place in prices.    
Stage 3: The final good producers compete in Cournot quantities in the final good market.  
Let us elaborate the game and the outcomes a little more. First the distinction between patent 
sale and licensing should be made clear. In stage 1, suppose firm 1 sells out the patent of the 
input producing technology. Thereafter it has to buy input from the input market. As a result 
input market will be monopoly of the independent input supplier. In other words, technology 
sale agreement strips firm 1 the right to use the technology and it has to buy input from the 
input market. This is tantamount to choosing the option of outsourcing the input from the 
independent input supplier. In case of technology licensing, firm 1 has the option of using the 
technology for its in-house production as well as producing for the input market. Then under 
licensing the input market will have two firms competing to supply inputs to firm 2. We 
make an assumption that firm 1 cannot commit to firm 3 in the licensing contract that it will 
not participate in the input market. We also show that it is always tempting for firm 1 to sell 
input in the market when it is undertaking the in-house production. Thus, given the positive 6 
 
incentive to breach such a contract of non participation in the input market, such 
commitment, even if written in the contract, has no value. When the contract is breached, the 
government would not be willing to enforce such a contract in the court of law as it is anti-
competitive. We show that in such circumstances of non-commitment the technology 
licensing will not occur.  
An alternative way to motivate the problem is that firm 1 shuts down the production facility 
of the input once the technology sale is agreed upon at a fixed price. By this way it is 
committing to outsource the input from the input supplier. And the other option of licensing 
in the given game may be thought of as no licensing action by firm 1. Our basic purpose is to 
show that firm 1, despite having a better technology (lower cost of input production), might 
choose outsourcing rather than in-house production of the input and this strategic outsourcing 
makes firm 1 better off. In case of outsourcing, firm 1 pays the same price for the input as its 
rival pays, however that price is much higher than the in-house cost of input production. The 
advantage of outsourcing comes from the sale of superior technology at a high price. 
 
3.1 Analysis of Benchmark Case 
 
The benchmark case presumes that firm 1 undertakes in-house production but without 
entering into the input market competition with firm 3. In other words, the benchmark case 
presents the scenario that firm 1 having the cost advantage in input production, just produces 
input for itself as a vertically integrated firm, and it neither sells the patent of the technology 
nor does it license the technology to firm 3, and also it does not sell the input to firm 2.  Thus, 
firm 2 buys input from firm 3, who is a monopoly supplier of the input in the input market. 
Clearly, firm 1 gets inputs at the cost price  1 c  per unit, but firm 2 pays  2 w  for inputs per unit 
charged by firm 3.  The market demand for the final good is assumed to be linear. This is, in 
inverse form, given by the equation 
         c     ), ( 2 1 > + − = − = a q q a Q a P                                                             (1) 
where P  is the price of the product and  i q  is the supply of the i-th firm,  2 , 1 = i .  
So for any  2 w , output stage equilibrium quantities are  7 
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In the input market firm 3’s demand comes only from firm 2 and thus its problem is : 
3 / ) 2 )( ( ) ( max 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 c w a c w q c w w + − − = − = π . 
This yields the optimal  2 w  as 
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The corresponding equilibrium quantities and profits are: 
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We assume that both firms are active by producing positive output in the output market. 
Thus, we have the restriction that, 








The benchmark case has ignored all other strategic considerations of firm 1 except its 
participation in the final good market as a Cournot player. We would now gradually 




3.2   In-house production with input market competition 
Let us introduce the possibility that firm 1, while produces inputs for itself, can also compete 
in the input market with firm 3 to supply input to firm 2. The competition in the input market 
is Bertrand price competition. Then under competition firm 1 gets inputs at price  1 c  per unit 
from its upstream division, firm 2 buys inputs at a price  } , min{ 2 1 w w w =  per unit, where  i w  
is the input price quoted by firm  3   , 1   ; = i i . Bertrand competition will lead to  2 c wi = . To 
avoid the open set problem in Bertrand competition we assume that firm with the lower cost 




Thus, firm 1 charges the limiting price  , and supplies inputs to firm 2. The equilibrium 
payoffs in this subgame are: 
   
3
) c 2c (
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3 = π                                                 (8) 
By comparing with the benchmark situation it is clear that input market competition leads to 
lower price of input for firm 2, which makes firm 2 a stronger rival in the final good market. 
This reduces firm 1’s profit earning from the final good market. Since input supply to firm 2 
is done by firm 1, it earns some extra profit from input sales. The net overall benefit of input 
market participation can go either way. Thus, it is quite possible that firm 1 may not like to 
participate in the input market and does better by simply undertaking the in-house production 
for itself. In the following subsection we first provide that comparison of payoffs in case it is 
possible for firm 1 to commit someway that it would not enter the input market. Then in 




                                                            
5 Note that under asymmetric cost Bertrand competition there exists another possibility that the cost efficient 
firm charging monopoly price could be an equilibrium if the monopoly price is below the cost of the inefficient 
rival firm. This possibility is ruled out due to the parameter restrictions considered here.  9 
 
 3.3  Input market competition and the problem of commitment 
Suppose firm 1 can commit not to enter the input market. Firm 1 would then like to commit 
not  to enter into input market competition if and only if  1
0
1
~ π π > . We can rewrite the 
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Check that  c c c < < ~
1 .  Therefore, when it is possible, firm 1 will commit not to compete 
in the input market with firm 3  ] ~ , [ 1 2 c c c ∈ ∀ . If  ) , ~ ( 2 c c c ∈ , it is better for firm 1 to compete 
in the input market with firm 3. 
 
Proposition 1: In case it is possible for firm 1 to commit not to enter into a competition in the 
input market with the independent input supplier, it would do so for all  ] ~ , [ 1 2 c c c ∈ . And for 
) , ~ ( 2 c c c ∈  firm 1 would like to participate in the input market competition.                                                 
Though firm 1 would prefer not to participate in the input market competition for small 
technology gap, but it cannot credibly commit to do so. The following lemma proves that. 
Note that until now we have analyzed different scenarios where firm 1 neither license the 
technology nor does it sell the technology.  10 
 
Lemma 1: No equilibrium is possible where firm 1 commits to stay out of the input market 
competition when it produces the input in-house for itself. 
Proof: Suppose there exists an equilibrium where firm 1 does not compete in the input 
market but it produces in-house. Now consider the following deviation. Given any choice of  
 by firm 3, firm 1 has incentive to enter the input market by matching  2 w , thereby it 
can supply the entire demand of firm 2. This does not change the outcome of the final good 
market but by matching the price quoted by firm 3 it can always increase its payoff from 
selling input to its rival.  Thus, firm 1 can retain its market operated payoff 
0
1 π  from the final 
good market, and get an additional profit from the input market by entering into the input 
market competition. Hence, the lemma is proved.  
Therefore, commitment is not possible and so only possible outcome under the possibility of 
in-house production will be that both firm 1 and 3 compete to supply inputs to firm 2. Given 
the cost advantage of firm 1 in input production, firm 3 will receive zero profit in 
equilibrium.  
Until now we were concerned with the outcome that would occur without technology sale or 
licensing. In view of Lemma 1 then the only possible equilibrium would be where no such 
deviation exists and that is characterized by the input market price equal c2,  and firm 1 
supplies the input and get its payoff given by (7). It follows from proposition 1 that due to the 
problem of commitment (described in lemma 1) firm 1 actually does weakly worse. Now we 
turn to the analysis of technology licensing and outsourcing and show that outsourcing solves 
this commitment problem and does better for firm 1 for some parameter range.  
In the context of our game, first note that there would not be any technology licensing. 
Suppose, on the contrary, firm 3 accepts an offer of technology licensing transfer at stage 1 of 
the game against a fixed fee. Then, given the no-commitment to participate in the input 
market, firm 1 has always the incentive to undercut and the Bertrand competition in the input 
market would lead to the price of input equal to c1. As a result the optimal fixed fee will be 
zero here. Given this prospect of licensing, firm 1 does better by not licensing the technology 
but participating in the input market. Thus, we have 
Proposition 2: Technology licensing will not occur in equilibrium. 11 
 
 
3.4 Outsourcing decision 
Suppose that firm 1, as an alternative to in-house input production, decides to sell its patent of 
the superior input production technology to firm 3. In case of sale firm 1 cannot undertake 
production because it does not have the necessary right to do so. Thus patent sale acts as a 
credible commitment not to produce inputs by itself, which essentially means that firm 1 
would outsource the input from the input market where firm 3 would be the monopoly seller. 
Under this scenario firm 3 first decides w, the price of input per unit, and then firm 1 and 2 
compete for quantities in the second stage. 
Now, for any w, each of firm 1 and 2 will produce  3 / ) ( w a q − = . Then firm 3’s first stage 
problem becomes: 
    q c w w 2 ) ( max 1 −  
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When firm 1 sells its patent, it charges a fixed price  0 > F ,  so its net payoff under 














                                                                   
 
Now,  F  is to be determined optimally. Since firm 3’s disagreement payoff is zero, we may 
assume that firm 1 extracts all payoff from firm 3 as fee, that is,  2 ˆ π = F . In this case, firm 1’s 
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Then outsourcing will occur if and only if  1
*
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where  1 81623 . 0 18377 . 0 * c a c + = . 
Thus, for low  2 c , outsourcing is the optimal strategy for firm 1. Hence, we have the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3:  Firm 1 will outsource the input to the independent input seller for all 










Thus, firm 1 would like to outsource for small technology gap but it would not do so if the 
technology gap is large. Note that as the technological advantage increases, the in-house 
production becomes more and more attractive for two reasons: First, firm 1 can make more 
profit from selling the input and would have more strategic cost advantage at the final good 
production stage. It should be clear that the strategic advantage of outsourcing stems mainly 
from the advantage of the input production technology of firm 1. Second, when firm 1 sells 
the patent in order to outsource from firm 3, it removes the input market competition. This 
increases the input price in the input market thereby softening the competition in the final 
good market. This advantage of extra profit from the final good market and the opportunity to 
extract the surplus from firm 3 due to patent sale make the outsourcing strategically 
advantageous for small technology gap. 
 
                                                            
6 Note that we are considering the outright sale of the patent and hence it is natural that the payment would be 
settled upfront. Therefore, we have considered a fixed price for the sale of the patent. However, allowing for a 
two-part tariff payment (fixed fee and royalty as considered in the technology licensing context) for the sale of 
patent we find that the optimal payment structure would be fixed price. The details are available from the 
authors on request.   13 
 
 
4. Welfare Analysis 
Consider industry profit and consumers’ surplus under outsourcing as compared to the case 




1 ~ ~ ~ ~ 2
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and industry profit under outsourcing   
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3 2 1 9
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We can easily check that  
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that is, when outsourcing is more profitable compared to in-house production, industry profit 
unambiguously falls under outsourcing. Here firm 1 benefits at the cost of firm 2. 
To see the effect of outsourcing on consumers’ welfare, under input market competition the 
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and that under outsourcing  
a q q Q ′ = + =
3
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Again, we have unambiguously, 
*) , (    ˆ ~
1 2 c c c Q Q ∈ ∀ >
 
Therefore, both consumers’ welfare and industry profit will fall under outsourcing. Hence, 
Proposition 4. Whenever outsourcing occurs, it is welfare reducing. 14 
 
This is indeed an important finding of our model. The reason for such welfare loss is easy to 
explain. Note that by strategic outsourcing firm 1 gains, but both firm 2 and consumers loose. 
This is because of high price that prevails in the input market due to outsourcing, and this 
leads to softening of competition in the final good market. Firm 2 looses due to higher input 
price, so does the consumer due to higher final good price. However, only firm 1 gains out of 
strategic outsourcing, but the gain is not sufficient to offset the loss due to double 
marginalization problem under monopoly input supply under outsourcing as compared to 
input market competition.  
 
5. Discussion 
First we demonstrate the role of technology transfer in our framework. Suppose, on the 
contrary, firm 1 does not have any technological advantage, i.e.,   . In such a scenario 
firm 1 cannot transfer the technology either as patent sale or licensing. It still has the option 
of outsourcing or in-house production purely based on the consideration of cost 
minimization. Given the price competition in the input market, the prevailing price would be 
, and firm 3 would be able to serve the entire demand that comes to the input market. In 
such a situation firm 1 is indifferent between outsourcing (i.e., buying input from the market) 
and in-house production. In other words there is no strategic advantage of outsourcing. One 
can ask whether there would be technology licensing or sale of patent from firm 3 to firm 1. 
Note that technology sale to firm 1 is equivalent to firm 1 acquiring firm 3 and in that case 
firm 1 would foreclose firm 2 from supplying input. This anticompetitive behavior is ruled 
out by the presence of antitrust authority in a country. However the technology licensing to 
firm 1 would not occur for the same reason as firm 1 cannot commit not to compete in the 
input market with firm 3 in case it undertakes in-house production. 
Our analysis is based on the assumption that firm 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer for its 
technology sale. A natural question is whether a bargaining between the two parties on the 
amount of payment would make any qualitative difference to the results derived in the paper. 
Since bargaining over the fixed payment does not change the choice of input price our 
analysis would hold as it is. The only difference is that the overall profit from the option of 
outsourcing would fall by the amount that would be appropriated by firm 3. As a result, the 
parameter zone for which the outsourcing would be preferred would shrink, unless the 15 
 
bargaining power of firm 3 is so high that firm1 would do better by not choosing that option 
for all parameter values. One way to justify the zero bargaining power of firm 3 is that the 
reservation payoff of firm 3 is zero, as without the technology sold to firm 3 it cannot even 
operate in the market. We have not considered the option of acquiring firm 3 by firm 1. Note 
that once firm 3 is acquired, then firm 1 would foreclose firm 2 from supplying inputs. As a 
result the market for the final good would be the monopoly of firm 1. This kind of acquisition 
leading to monopoly is not generally allowed by antitrust authority in any country.    
Another related point is what happens if there is a competitive fringe to supply the input 
rather than one independent input supplier. In this case technology licensing to one or more 
firms will not be possible due to the commitment problem of input market competition. Now 
technology sale to one input supplier among the competitive fringe may be possible, but the 
equilibrium price in the input market would then be   and the firm which would buy the 
patent would serve the input market. However, firm 1 could then extract   price-cost 
margin per unit of input demand. By in-house production firm 1, in fact, would do better 
because since its own cost of production would be low (i.e., c1) and the profit from selling 
input to firm 2 would remain the same. Thus, it is easy to understand that by simply 
producing the input in-house and then by selling the input to its rival at the cost price of the 
other input suppliers, firm 1 does better than outsourcing. This is true whenever there is more 
than one independent input supplier.  
Our welfare result sheds an important light on the issue of international outsourcing also. 
Suppose, firm 1 and firm 2 are from North and firm 3 is from a southern country. The final 
good is produced and consumed in the North. The northern firms have the option of 
outsourcing from the south. Let the per unit input cost of production by firm 3 (the southern 
firm) be  t c c + = 2 , where c is the basic cost of production and t the trade cost which 
includes both transport and tariff imposed by the North. Suppose, due to trade liberalization 
trade cost falls leading to a fall in  2 c . Suppose we begin from a situation where the difference 
between c1 and c2 is high so that the input market is characterized by competition and the 
outcome is that firm 1 supplies input to firm 2 at the competitive price. Now, with the advent 
of trade liberalization the difference of costs between c1 and c2 falls, as a result outsourcing 
from the South becomes profitable. Here outsourcing is triggered by trade liberalization and 
welfare in the North ultimately falls. Hence, there is good enough reason for the North to be 16 
 
skeptical about too much outsourcing, especially when this is driven by strategic 
consideration rather than cost consideration. Our model provides a foundation for such 
welfare reducing outsourcing in the international context.
7
We have analyzed the problem in a setting where an integrated firm competes in the final 
goods market with a rival that has to depend on the input market for the supply of input and 
the independent input producer has an inferior input producing technology. The integrated 
firm by selling off the patent of its technology to the independent input producing firm 
credibly commits to purchase inputs from the monopoly input seller. This raises not only its 
own production cost but also that of the rival. Thus by transferring its technology not only it 
captures the surplus profit of the input supplier by means of a fee, but outsourcing helps in 
reducing competition in the final goods market.  In this set up, the overall industry profit falls 
in the final good market due to high price in the input market under outsourcing. The 
outsourcing firm manages to appropriate an extra surplus from the input supplier through a 




In this paper we have shown the possibility that although a firm possesses a superior input 
producing technology, it outsources the crucial input from outside at a much higher price than 
its in-house production cost under some parametric configurations. More specifically, the 
outsourcing occurs when the technological gap between its in-house input production and that 
of the outside input supplier is not large and it would produce the input in-house and also 
supply to its rival when the technology gap is large. Outsourcing leads to high input price, 
which softens the competition in the final good market. We have introduced the issue of 
technology transfer in the outsourcing literature and provided a new strategic reason for 
outsourcing which was hitherto not recognized in the literature.  
 
                                                            
7 There are some interesting papers which stress the welfare loss as a result of outsourcing decision of firms. For 
instance, see Marjit and Mukherjee (2008), Mukherjee and Tsai (2010). There exists a considerable literature 
dealing with different aspects of international outsourcing. In particular, Chen et al (2004) dealt with the 
strategic outsourcing in the international context and focused on the effect of trade liberalization in intermediate 
input which might lead to higher prices for inputs as well as for final goods.  
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market becomes the worst sufferer as it has to buy the input at a higher price. And consumers 
also suffer because of double marginalization in the upstream and downstream pricing that 
raises the final products price. Our analysis thus raises a serious policy concern over the 
strategic outsourcing. 
Though we have posed the problem in the context of a standard vertical structure model of 
industrial organization, our model is equally applicable in the context of international 
outsourcing. One such application is discussed in the paper. If outsourcing is triggered by 
trade liberalization, then it is likely that welfare in the countries which indulge in outsourcing 
might fall even though the firms which are engaged in strategic outsourcing actually gain. 
Thus, there is reasonable concern over excessive outsourcing which occurs beyond the cost 
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